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Current Developments Under 9

UCC - Article
By Roy L. STmIEIimm, JR.

Scope of Article 9
As you will recall, Article 9 states that
it applies to all secured transactions involving "personal property" which includes much more than just goods. The
term "personal property" also includes
accounts, contract rights, general intangibles, chattel paper, instruments and
documents. We must comply with Article
9 when creating security interests in any
of these items. Several interesting cases
have come along to emphasize the pitfalls which may snare those who are not
sensitive to the broad spectrum of transactions covered by Article 9.
One type of problem which can arise
is illustrated by Jacobs v. Northeastern
Corp., 416 Pa. 417, 206 A. 2d 49 (1965)
and U.S. v. Fleetwood, 165 F. Supp.
723 (D.C. Pa. 1958). Section 400.9-102
of the Code provides that Article 9 applies to "security interests created by
contract" including "any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended
to create a security interest in . . . contract rights." With this in mind, consider the position of a surety which furnishes a performance or a payment bond
covering the contractor on a construction
project. If the contractor becomes insolvent and fails to complete performance
or to pay the claims of laborers and materialmen, the surety must put up the
money under its bond. Having done so,
the surety would like to lay claim to
any "drag" monies which may still be
owing on the construction project to the
January 1968

insolvent contractor. But the representative of the insolvent contractor will object to this as preferential treatment of
the surety over other creditors of the
insolvent contractor. One way around
this objection would be for the surety
to claim that the contractor had assigned
to the surety his rights to payment under
the construction contract to the extent
necessary to cover any advances made
by the surety. But is such an assignment
of contract rights one intended for security so that we have an Article 9 secured transaction? The court in U.S. v.
Fleetwood so held and since the surety
had not filed a financing statement to
perfect his security interest in the contract rights, the trustee in bankruptcy
prevailed. One might conjecture as to
why no reference was made in this case
to Section 400.9-302(1) (e) which provides for automatic perfection of a security interest in "an assignment of . . .
contract rights which does not alone or
in conjunction with other assignments to
the same assignee transfer a significant
part of the outstanding . . . contract
rights of the assignor." Perhaps the safety valve provided by this section could
have been appropriately used by the
surety in this case. Another approach
which the surety could use is to rely on
subrogation doctrines claiming the right
to be subrogated to the insolvent contractor's claim to the payments still due
under the construction contract. Article
9 applies only to security interests "created by contract" and rights of subroga9
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which should have been perfected by
filing a financing statement. Some might
be inclined to question .whether a claim
to an income tax refund is a "contract
right" (Sections 400.9-106 and 400.1-201
(11)). Some might wonder whether the
safety valve provided by Section 400.9302 (1) (e) could have saved the assignment from the clutches of the trustee in
bankruptcy.
Further with regard to the scope of
Article 9, it has been held that assignmqnt of a tort claim is not a secured
transaction subject to Article 9. Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bargain City
U.S.A., 251 F. Supp. 221 (D.C. Pa. 1967)
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tion are created by law to avoid injustice
and are not consensual in nature. Under
this analysis it would seem that we do
not have a secured transaction which is
subject to Article 9. This is the substance
of the holding by the majority of the
court in Jacobs v. Northeastern Corp.
These cases certainly demonstrate the
careful attention which must be given
to the pervasive coverage of Article 9.
In re Ljosheim, 4 UCC Rep. Serv. 46
(D.C. Cal. 1967) further emphasizes the
need for care in matters relating to assignment of contract rights. Here an attorney had taken an assignment of his
client's claim to an income tax refund
as security for attorney's fees. When the
client became bankrupt, it was held that
the trustee in bankruptcy took priority
over the attorney's claim to the income
tax refund because this transaction involved an assignment of contract rights

aff'd 373 F.2d 701 (3rd Cir. 1967). A
liquor permit is a "general intangible"
(Section 400.9-106) which can be the
subject of a security interest under Article 9. Paramount Fin. Co. v. U.S., 379
F.2d 543 (6th Cir. 1967). The coin collection of a numismatist is "goods" (Section 400.9-105(1) (f)) which can be the
subject of a security interest under Article 9. In re Midas Coin Co., 264 F.Supp.

193 (D.C. Mo. 1967).
The Code treatment of consignment
arrangements deserves some comment
since it represents a potential trap for
the unwary as indicated by several recent
cases. Section 400.9-102 says that Article
9 applies to "any transaction (regardless
of its form) which is intendd to create
a security interest in personal property"
and, more specifically, to "security interests created by contract including . . .
consignment intended as security." Section 400.1-201(37) says that "[ulnless a
*

.

. consignment is intended as security,

reservation of title thereunder is not a
'security interest.'" Much of the purpose
in attempting to draw fine lines of distinction between consignments which are
intended for security and those which
are not is frustrated, however, by the
further provision in Section 400.1-201
(37) that "a consignment is in any event
subject to the provisions on consignment
sales" in Section 400.2-326. When we
look at this section, we find that goods
delivered on consignment are "deemed
to be on sale or return" and that goods
held on sale or return are subject to the
Journal of Missouri Bar

claims of consignee's creditors. But the
consigned goods can be protected from
this awful fate if the consignor does one
of the three things suggested in Section
400.2-326(3). The first alternative---complying with any applicable, sign-posting
law-is available only in those few states
which have enacted such laws as the
consignor learned to his sorrow in In
re Doumtown Drugstores, 3 UCC Rep.
Serv. 27 (D.C. Pa. 1965). The second alternative should be regarded primarily as
an escape hatch to be used only as a last
resort. It will not apparently be easy
under this alternative to establish that
the consignee is "generally known to his
creditors to be substantially engaged in
selling the goods of others" as is indicated by General Electric Co. v. Pettingill Supply Co., 347 Mass. 631, 199
N.E.2d 326 (1964). This leaves us with
the third alternative-comply with the
filing provisions of Article 9. So when all
is said and done, the only sensible course
in most situations is to treat the consignment arrangement as a secured transaction and comply with Article 9.
As to leases, again the provisions of
Section 400.9-102 are our starting point.
From these provisions we see that a lease
will be subject to Article 9 only if it is
"intended to -create a security interest."
This leaves us with the age-old problem
of the distinction between "pure" leases
and leases which are really security
agreements. But the Code does try to
give us a little guidance on this problem.
Section 400.1-201(37) provides that
"[w]hether a lease is intended as security
is to be determined by the facts of each
case." This generalization is of little help.
But there is more. It is further provided
that "the inclusion of' an option to purchase does not of itself make the lease
one intended for security." It does not
follow from this provision that a lease
is a "pure" lease simply because reference to an option to purchase is omitted.
The solution to the problem is not this
simple as is indicated by In re Transcontinental Industries, 3 UCC Rep. Serv.
235 (D.C. Ga. 1965). In this case United
States Leasing Corporation argued that
its leases were "pure" leases because
January 1968

they did not contain options to purchase..
The referee, however, pointed out that
the Code makes the distinction between
"pure" leases and leases intended as security depend on all of the facts of each
,case. Since United States Leasing Corporation was essentially engaged in financing the acquisition of goods by
lessees who were permitted to keep the
goods at the end of the lease term despite the fact that there was no option
to purchase, the referee found that the
leases were intended as security. Section
400.1-201(37) further provides that "an
agreement that upon compliance with the
terms of the lease the lessee shall become or has the option to become the
owner of the property for no additional
consideration or for a nominal consideration does make the lease one intended
for security." This raises the problem of
what is a "nominal consideration." Just
any kind of balloon payment at the end
of the lease term won't solve the problem. The payment should be related to
the actual value of the goods at the end
of the lease term. In re Washington Processing Co., 3 UCC Rep. Serv. 475 (D.C.
Cal; 1966) and In re Wheatland Electric
Products Co., 237 F. Supp. 820 (D.C.
Pa. 1964).
Removal From the State
Of Goods Subject to a Perfected

Security Interest
. Section 400.9-103 (3) deals with problems of perfection when goods are moved
from one state to another. For example,
assume a security interest in goods is
perfected in Missouri and then the goods
are moved to Kansas. This section says
that the Missouri perfection continues
effective for four months after removal
of the goods to Kansas. At the end of
the four-month period, the security interest becomes unperfected unless appropriate action is taken in Kansas within
the four-month period to continue the
perfection. Now suppose nothing is done
in Kansas to continue perfection beyond
the four-month period. If a bona fide
purchaser purchases the goods from the
debtor in Kansas six months after removal, he obviously should prevail over

the security interest of the secured party
on which the perfection had lapsed at
the time of purchase (Section 400.9-301
(1)(c)). But suppose the bona fide
purchaser purchases within the fourmonth period while the Missouri perfection is still effective in Kansas. Normally
a perfected security interest will prevail
over a bona fide purchaser and our bona
fide purrhaser will lose (Section 400.9301(1) (c)) unless the fact that the secured party has allowed his perfection
to lapse subsequent to, the purchase affects the result. The courts have held
that the rights of the parties are fixed
and determined as of the time of purchase and are not affected by subsequent
events. So our bona fide purchaser loses
in this situation. Thus substantial rights
depend on the accident of whether the
purchase takes place before or after expiration of the four-month period. First
Nat. Bank of Bay Shore v. Stamper, 93
N.J. Super. 150, 225 A.2d 162 (Super.
Ct. N.J. 1966); Al Maroone Fordv. Manheim Auto Auction, 205 Pa: Super. 154,
.208 A.2d 290 (Super. Ct. Pa. 1965).
Compare the provisions of Section 400.9312(4) where failure of the secured party to file within the ten-day period deprives him of purchase money priority
status even as to interests which intervened before the ten-day period had expired.
The four-month limitation on perfection after goods are removed from the
state does not apply if perfection is accomplished by notation of the security
interest on a certificate of title as in the
case of motor vehicles (Section 400.9103(4)). Apparently the perfection by
notation continues effective after removal to another state so long as the certificate of title bearing the notation remains
in force and effect. In re White, 266 F.
Supp. 863 (D.C. N.Y. 1967).
The Security Agreement
Except for pledge transactions, a written security agreement is necessary to
create a security interest (Section 400.9203). In several cases where the secured
party was caught short, it has been argued that the financing statement fulfills

the requirement of a written security
agreement. This argument has been consistently rejected. Mid-Eastern Electronics v. FirstNat. Bank, 380 F.2d 355 (4th
Cir. 1967); American CardCo. v. H.M.H.
Co., 97 R.I. 59, 196 A.2d 150 (1963). As
the Code stands these cases 'seem "to be
correct. Section 400.9-105 (1) (h) defines
"security agreement" as "an agreement
[defined in Section 400.1-201(3)] which
creates or provides for a security interest." The contents of a financing statement don't meet the demands of this
definition (Section 400.9-402). Nor will
notation of a lien on the certificate of
title for a vehicle (In re Nipper, 3 UCC
Rep. Serv. 1178 (D.C. Ore. 1966)) or
the retention of the certificate of title
by the secured party (McDonald v. Peoples Automobile Loan & Fin., 115 Ga.
App. 483, 154 S.E.2d 886 (Ct. App. Ga.
1967)) be an acceptable substitute for
a written security agreement.
As to adequacy of description of the
collateral in the security agreement, the
Code'seems to be accomplishing its intended result of eliminating high technicality. In re Goodfriend, 2 UCC Rep.
Serv. 160 (D.C. Pa. 1964). But care
must be exercised to be sure you have
described each type of collateral which
is involved in the transaction. In U.S. v.
Antenna Systems, Inc., 251 F. Supp.
1013, (D.C. N.H. 1966) the collateral
was described as "all furniture, fixtures
and equipment" of the debtor. The court
held that this description did not include
engineering blueprints and technical data
developed by debtor's engineers because
such items were "general intangibles"
rather than "goods."
The Code seems to have given new
life to the waiver of defense clause when
inserted in an installment sale security
agreement covering equipment. Section
400.9-206 contemplates that such a
clause shall be given full force and effect in equipment financing and in Beam
v. John Deere Co., 240 Ark. 98, 398
S.W.2d 218 (1966) the court so held.
A pair of cases (In re Dorset Steel
Equipment Co. and In re Elkins-Dell
Mfg. Co., 253 F.Supp. 864 (D.C. Pa.
1965)) have raised the issue of unconJournal of Missouri Bar

scionability of a security agreement. As
might be expected when this issue is
raised, the courts are apparently going
to be guided by the provisions of Section 400.2-302 dealing with unc6nscionability of sale -contracts.
In re United Thrift Stores, 363 F.2d
11 (3rd Cir. -1966) confirms the fact
that Section 400.9-205 has destroyed
the questionable but pertinacious doctrine of Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353
(1925).
The Financing Statement
Problems usually arise in this area because of carelessness in the preparation
of the financing statement by your clients. The Code recognizes that mechanical mistakes will inevitably be made in
the preparation of financing statements.
Section 400.9-402(5) provides that a
"financing statement substantially complying with the requirements of this section is effective even though it contains
minor errors which are not seriously misleading." I am happy to report that the
courts have embraced this philosophy
wholeheartedly. To many of you this will
be a refreshing change. Now let's take
a look at some of the errors which have
triggered litigation.
First, the requirement of signature of
the secured party on the financing statement (Section 400.9-402(1)). I would
note in passing that some might properly question whether the Code should
have required the signature of the secured party on the financing statement.
It seems to serve little useful purpose. It
is interesting, however, that the courts
have not attempted to solve problems
arising out of the secured party's signature by calling them "minor errors." Instead the courts have turned to. the definition of "signed" (Section 400.1-201
(39)) which makes "any symbol executed or adopted by a party" operate
as his signature. Under this definition
the courts have been willing to find that
if the secured party's name appears anywhere in the financing statement it will
operate as his signature: Plemens v. Didde-Glaser, Inc., 244 Md. 556, 224 A.2d
464 (Ct. App. Md. 1966); In re HorJanuary 1968

vath, 1 UCC Rep. Serv. 624 (D.C. Conn.
1963); Benedict v. Lebowitz, 346 F.2d
120 (2nd Cir. 1965). This approach is
commendable and is in keeping with
the -spirit of the Code which abhors
pointless technicality.
Another requirement of Section 400.9402(1) is that the secured party's address must appear in the financing statement. This requirement also seems to
serve little useful purpose for nowhere
in Article 9 is a third party given the
right to demand information directly
from the secured party. Only the debtor
can demand information from the secured party and he should know where
to find the secured party without resort
to the address in the financing statement.
Can it be said that omission of secured
party's address is a "minor error"? The
New Mexico Supreme Court, in what
seems to me to be a questionable opinion,
has said "no." Strevell-Paterson Finance
Co. v. May, 77 N.M. 331, 422 P.2d 366
(1967).
When it comes to the requirement of
debtor's signature on the financing statement, we have a different problem. Obviously debtor's signature on a financing
statement is essential and the courts
should not be -charitable in tolerating
errors. In re Causer's Town and Country
Supermarket, 2 UCC Rep. Serv. 541
(D.C. Ohio 1965) properly held that
omission of the debtor's signature on the
financing statement was fatal to perfection.
The requirement in Section 400.9-402
(1) that the financing statement must
state the name of the debtor can raise
some interesting problems. What is to be
done if the debtor's name is not correctly phrased or spelled in the financing
statement? Is this "minor error" which
should be excused? Improper spelling of
the debtor's name can lead to improper
indexing of the financing statement
which in turn can lead to a person being
misled when a search of the records is
made. If a third party has actually been
misled in his search of the records, it
would seem that the errors in debtor's
name are not "minor errors" for they
have actually been seriously misleading

terest in the same' equipment. No additional filing is made. Before this loan
is paid off, debtor becomes bankrupt.
The security interest created by the
second security agreement is perfected
against the trustee in bankruptcy because
the single filing as to equipment protects
the secured party in all financing transactions with the debtor involving this
equipment for a period of five years or
until a termination statement is filed.
See In re McCroskey, 4 UCC Rep. Serv.
237 (D.C. Ohio 1966). Now let's take
this kind of a case which raises the
question of the effect of future advances
under the notice filing concept. Lender
# 1 files a financing statement covering
equipment worth $10,000 and advances
$1,000 pursuant to a security agreement
Perfection of the Security Interest
with a provision for future advances.
Filing of a financing statement is un- Lender # 2 subsequently files a fidoubtedly the commonest method used to nancing statement covering the same
perfect a security interest. Several mat- equipment and advances $6,000. Later
ters should be mentioned regarding this Lender # 1 advances an additional
method of perfection. Remember that the $5,000. Because of the notice filing conCode adopts the notice filing concept. cept, Lender # 1 should have priority
The security agreement itself never is for his full exposure of $6,000 before
required to be filed. All that is required Lender # 2 gets anything. Lender # 1
to be filed is a financing statement which had locked up the collateral for his beneis a simple notice that the secured party fit by his filing. Precise amounts adand the debtor intend to deal with one vanced by him and the timing of such
another with respect to the collateral advances are immaterial. The notice
described in the financing statement. The filing warned Lender # 2 that he was
exact nature of their dealings in this col- dealing with the collateral at. his peril
lateral is immaterial. In a sense the and that his rights would be junior to
filing gives the secured party a monopoly whatever rights Lender # 1 might have
on the described collateral while the under the first-to-file rule (Section 400.9financing statement is effective. Any- 312(5) (a)). The court in Coin-o-Matic
one else who tries to procure an interest Service Co. v. Rhode Island Hospital
in this collateral while the filing is ef- 'Trust Co., 3 UCC Rep. Serv. 1112
fective does so at his peril because he (Sup. Ct. R.I. 1966) failed to appreciate
has been forewarned that the secured the significance of this concept and
party has already "staked a claim" to reached what, to my mind, is an unthe collateral. To illustrate, let us sup- fortunate result. One would hope this
pose that a secured party files a financing case will not be followed elsewhere.
The Code has some rather explicit
statement covering equipment of the
debtor. Debtor signs a security agree- provisions regarding what constitutes
ment granting a security interest in the the filing of a financing statement. And
equipment and a loan is made. This these provisions can become important.
loan is paid off but no termination state- Suppose for example, you tender a fiment is filed. A few months later debtor nancing statement to the filing officer and
borrows some more money from secured he refuses to accept it because it is his
party pursuant to a new security agree- "curbstone" opinion that the financing
ment which again grants a security in- stat inent is not properly drawn. Section

and they should not be excused under
Section 400.9-402(5). But suppose thaf
the third party raising the issue of the
errors in debtor's name has not made a
search of the records so that the error
did not actually. mislead him. Isn't such
a party opportunistically relying on sheer
technicality to frustrate the transaction
and to gain an advantage? If so, shouldn't
a court hold that the errors were "minor"
and "not seriously misleading"? There is
some indication that the courts may approach the problem in this fashion. In
re Excel Stores, Inc., 341 F.2d 961 (2nd
Cir. 1965); Matter of Vaughan, 4 UCC
Rep. Serv. 61 (D.C. Mich. 1967); In re
Bengtson, 3 UCC Rep. Serv. 283 (D.C.
Conn. 1965).
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400.9-403(1) provides that "[p]resentation for filing of a financing statement
and tender of the filing fee . . . constitutes filing" under Article 9. So if the
chips are down and it becomes important to you, it should be possible to
establish the fact of filing even though
the filing officer has refused to accept
the financing statement. Compare In re
Smith, 205 F. Supp. 27 (D.C. Pa. 1962)
which seems to have been wrongly decided in light of this Code provision.
Suppose the filing officer accepts your.
financing statement but fails to index it.
Have you filed? The answer seems to be
obvious from the provision in Section
400.9-403(1) that "acceptance of the
[financing] statement constitutes filing."
The contrary holding in In re Herron, 1
UCC Rep. Serv. 526 (D.C.. Pa. 1962)
is unfortunate.
Great care must be exercised in the
perfection of security interests in goods
which may become fixtures. Not the
least of our difficulties lies in recognizing
whether we have a fixture involved in
the transaction-a problem on which
the Code offers us no real assistance
(Section 400.9-313(1)). Take the case
of goods which are classified as business
equipment (as opposed to farm equipment). If the equipment does not become a fixture, a filing with the secretary
of state will be necessary. (Section 400.9-401(1)(c)). But if the equipment
becomes a fixture only a local filing is
necessary (Section 400.9-401(1) (b)).
Or assume we have a purchase money
security interest in consumer goods. If
the consumer goods do not become fixtures, no filing is necessary for we can
rely on automatic perfection (Section
400.9-302(1) (d)). But if they become
fixtures, a local filing will be necessary
(Section 400.9-401(1) (b)). When there
is doubt as to whether fixture financing
is involved, it seems sensible to cover
yourself both ways as to perfection .or
else you may be caught short. See In re
Park CorrugatedBox Corp., 249 F. Supp.
56 (D.C. N.J. 1966); In re Collier, 3
UCC Rep.. Serv. 1076 (D.C. Tenn.
1966); In re Keystone Baking Co., 1
UCC Rep. Serv. 606 (D.C. Pa. 1958).
January 1968

Priorities of Security Interests
Trustee in bankruptcy. In discussing
the priorities of security interests in the
bankruptcy context, I want to look at
the trustee's powers under. Sections '70
and 60 of the Bankruptcy Act.
Let's look first at the trustee's powers
under Section 70(c) which contains the
so-called "strong arm" clause. This gives
the trustee the powers of a hypothetically perfect lien creditor as of the date of
bankruptcy as- to property of the bankrupt. Assume that we have an unperfected security interest in collateral of
the debtor at the time of bankruptcy. On
the date of bankruptcy the trustee has
the powers of a lien creditor as to this
collateral and, as such, he will prevail
over the unperfected security interest
(Section 400.9-301(1)(b)). See In re
Hall, 248 F. Supp. 124 (D.C. 1965). But
if the security interest is perfected (including automatic perfection) before the
date of bankruptcy, the perfected security interest will have priority over the
trustee as a subsequent lien creditor
(Section 400.9-301(1)(b)). See In re
Lucacos, 1 UCC Rep. Serv. 553 (D.C.
Pa. 1957).
Under Section 70(e) the trustee is
empowered to exercise for the benefit
of the bankrupt estate the actual rights
of any general creditors having provable
claims. Prior to the Code this power of
the trustee created serious problems in a
number of states where it was held that
an unreasonable delay in recording of a
chattel mortgage, for example, rendered
the mortgage lien void as to a general
creditor who intervened between the time
the mortgage was executed and the time
it was recorded. Where such doctrine prevailed, the trustee could step into the
shoes of the interim general creditor
under Section,70(e) and strike down
the mortgage lien for the benefit of the
bankrupt estate. This should no longer
be possible under the Code as is indicated by the well reasoned opinion in
In re Weeks, 2 UCC Rep. Serv. 870
-(D.C. Mich. 1964); aff'd 2 UCC Rep.
Serv. 877 (D.C. Mich. 1965).
Under Section 60 the trustee is empowered to void preferential transfers

as defined in that section. For our purposes the critical elements of a preferential transfer are that it must be a transfer of the bankrupt's property which is'
made within four months of bankruptcy
for an antecedent debt. The granting of
a security interest by the debtor is a
transfer under Section 60. Such a transfer is deemed to have been made under
Section 60 when the security interest
is perfected against lien creditors. If the
perfection occurs within four months of
bankruptcy for an antecedent debt, we
have the makings of a voidable preference.
For example, assume that on 2/1/67 a
secured party lends money to debtor
pursuant to a security agreement granting
a security interest in collateral. However,
secured party does not file a financing
statement until 8/1/67. Debtor becomes
bankrupt on 8/15/67. In this example
the security interest attached (Section
400.9-204) on 2/1/67 but it was not perfected (Section 400.9-303) until 8/1/67.
So under Section 60 we have a transfer
(perfection) within four months of
bankruptcy for an antecedent debt
(since value was given back on 2/1/67)
and we are on the road to a voidable
preference. This example illustrates the
so-called "pocket lien" practice at which
Section 60 was directed. Observe that
by employing this technique the secured party has attached a security interest to the bankrupt's property but has
kept this fact a secret from other creditors until he filed shortly before bankruptcy in a last minute effort to protect
himself at the expense of other creditors. Such practice is clearly condemned
by Section 60 and the "Johnny come lately" perfection of the security interest
should be voidable.-See In re Jeavons, 2
UCC Rep. Serv. 644 (D.C. Ohio 1965).
Now we come to the problem on
which so much erudition has been expended and so much ink spilled-the
voidable preference problem in the context of the floating lien under the Code.
Assume that on 2/1/67 secured party
lends $50,000 to debtor under the terms
of security agreement which grants a
security interest in all of debtor's inventory which is now owned or here-

after acquired. Assume also that secured
party has filed a financing statement
covering this transaction at the outset.
When the transaction is initiated on
2/1/67 secured party has a perfected
security interest in debtor's existing in-

ventory. Now let's assume that on the
first day of each succeeding month from
March to August the debtor acquires
additional inventory and then debtor becomes bankrupt on 8/15/67. Can a
preferential transfer be established as to
the after-acquired inventory which came
into the debtor's hands within four
months of bankruptcy? To lay the basis
for a case of preferential transfer the
writers have argued that the security
interest in after-acquired inventory cannot attach (Section 400.9-204) until it
is acquired by the debtor and perfection
cannot take place under the filing until
such attachment occurs (Section 400.9303). So, the writers say, we have a
series of transfers of the debtor/bankrupt's property occurring each month as
the secured party's security interest attached and became perfected as to the
after-acquired property. So far so good.
The writers then conclude that the
transfers of security interests in afteracquired inventory which occurred
within four months of bankruptcy must
be for an antecedent debt since the secured party advanced the $50,000 to
the debtor way back in February. Here
I must part company with them. To my
mind the need for true floating lien
financing is an economic fact of life. Its
legitimate use should be protected from
a crippling application of Section 60.
In other words Section 60 should be
applied to the floating lien transaction
only if the Bankruptcy Act clearly makes
such application inevitable and inescapable. I find nothing in the Bankruptcy Act which leads inexorably to
the application of Section 60 to floating
lien financing. Consider the legislative
history of Section 60. It was directed
essentially at the unfairness typified by

the pocket lien transaction. But the
floating lien transaction is not pocket
lien stuff. From the start of the floating

lien transaction there is full and fair
Journal of Missouri Bar

disclosure of what is happening through • 216 NE 2d 105- (1966). This rule apthe filing of a financing statement. So it plies where the secured party is relying
seems fair to say that Section 60 was on automatic perfection of a purchase
not directed at legitimate transactions of money security interest in farm equipthis type. And there seems to be nothing ment or consumer goods (Section 400.9in the language of Section 60 which 302(1) (c) and (d)) unless the good
requires its application to ,the floating faith purchaser is a consumer or a
lien transaction. The term "antecedent farmer (Section 400.9-307(2)). Nationdebt" is not defined in the Bankruptcy al Shawmut Bank of Boston v. Vera,
Act thus leaving it open to our courts 223 NE 2d 515 (Sup. Ct. Mass. 1967)
to construe this term in a manner which involves an interesting situation in which
is consonant with the policy of the Bank- a lien creditor who had levied on
ruptcy Act and with the needs of the consumer goods subject to an autobusiness community for floating lien matically perfected purchase money sefinancing. A construction of this term curity interest put the goods up for sale
along the lines suggested by Section and then purchased them at the execu400.9-108 seems appropriate and per- tion sale. When the secured party found
missible to serve these ends without out what was going on, it sued the lien
violating the policy of the Bankruptcy creditor for conversion claiming priority
Act. Fortunately the two cases which under Section 400.9-301(1)(b). Lien
have considered the problem to date creditor countered with the argument
indicate that our courts are sympathetic that he was now in the position of a
to the need for floating lien financing consumer who had purchased the goods
and feel it can be accommodated under in good faith and was protected by SecSection 60 of the Bankruptcy Act. In re tion 400.9-30p7(2). The court properly
Portland Newspaper Publishing Co., 4 held that the lien creditor could not
UCC Rep. Serv. 533 (D.C. Ore. 1967) bootstrap himself into a position of prireversing 3 UCC Rep. Serv. 194 (D.C. ority in this way.
Ore. 1966); Rosenberg v. Rudnick, 262
Buyers in ordinary course of bushess.
F. Supp. 635 (D.C. Mass. 1967). For Except for farm products, the buyer in
those who are still leery of the problem, ordinary course of business takes free
it can be avoided by some careful struc- of a perfected security interest (Section
turing and policing of the floating lien 400.9-307(1)). Sterling Acceptance Co.
transaction. For example, if the monies v. Grimes, 194 Pa. Super. 503, 168 A.
received from the sale of inventory by 2d 600 (1961). Most of the problems in
the debtor are earmarked as proceeds this area to date seem to center around
of the inventory and these monies are the question of when a buyer can qualithen used to purchase additional inven- fy as a "buyer in ordinary course of
tory, the after-acquired inventory be- business" (Section 400.1-201 (9)). Can
comes proceeds of the proceeds of the a dealer who buys' in ordinary course
original inventory (Section 400.9-306 from another dealer qualify? Can he
(1)) and the perfection of the original qualify even though he knows of the
inventory continues into the after-ac- existence of the security interest in the
quired inventory as proceeds withont inventory when he buys? The court
answers both of these questions in the
interruption (Section 400.9-306(3) (a))
thus avoiding the Section 60 preference affirmative in Main Investment Co. v.
problem. See Howarth v. UniversalC.T.T. Gisolfi, 203 Pa. Super. 244, 119 A.2d
Corp., 203 F. Supp. 279 (D.C. Pa. 535 (1964). But a dealer who not only
knows of the security interest but also
1962).
Bona fide purchasers. The Code pro- knows that sale of the goods to him is
vides that a perfected security interest b forbidden under the terms of the security
takes priority over a bona fide purchaser agreement cannot qualify as a buyer in
(Section 400.9-301 (1) (c)). Prime Busi- ordinary course of business. 0. M. Scott
ness Co. v. Drinkwater, 350 Mass. 642, Credit Corp. v. Apex, Inc., 97 R.I. 442,
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198 A.2d 673 (1964). Nor can one
who does not give new value qualify.
Evans Products Co. v. Jorgensen, 421 P.
2d 978 (Sup. Ct. Ore. 1966).
Under Section 400.9-307(1), the buyer of farm products in ordinary course of
business is not protected against a perfected security interest in the farm products. But Clovis Natl. Bank v. Thomas,
77 N.M. 554, 425 P. 2d 726 (1967)
indicates that a court which does not
like this rule can easily side-step it unless
the secured party has carefully structured
and policed the secured transaction.
First-to-file or first-to-perfect. When
both security interests are perfected by
filing, the first-to-file takes priority (Section 400.9-312(5) (a)). This rule operates even though the secured party who
filed first had knowledge of the competing security interest when he filed.
In re Gunderson, 4 UCC Rep. Serv. 358
(D.C. Ill. 1967). In French Lumber Co.
v. Commercial Realty & Finance Co.,
346 Mass. 716, 195 N.E. 2d 507 (1964),
a secured party who refinanced an obligation and could easily have had the
benefit of the first-to-file rule had he
taken an assignment of the rights of the
original secured party was saved by the
court through doctrines of subrogation.
Lonoke Production Credit Assn. v.
Bohannon, 238 Ark. 206, 379 S.E. 2d
17 (1964), is a good illustration of the
operation of the first-to-perfect rule
where one security interest is perfected
automatically and another is perfected
by filing (Section 400.9-312(5)(b)).
Fixtures. An unperfected security interest which attaches to goods before they
are affixed to the realty as fixtures takes
priority over prior-real estate interests
(Section 400.9-313). In re Royers Bakery, Inc., 1 UCC Rep. Serv. 570 (D.C.
Pa. 1963). Unfortunately the court
seems to have overlooked the applicability of this rule to the situation in U.S. v.
Baptist Golden Age Home, 266 F. Supp.
892 (D.C. Ark. 1964).
Accessions. The priority rules as to
accessions are similar to those for fixtures
(Section 400.9-314). If the security interest attaches to goods before they are
affixed as accessions to the whole, the

security interest, though unperfected,
takes priority over existing interests in
the whole. The problem of priority of
interests in accessions to aircraft was
discussed in International Atlas, Inc. v.
Twentieth Century Aircraft Company,
251 Cal. App. 2d 495, 59 Cal. Rptr. 495
(Ct. App. Cal. 1967). The court unfortunately suggests in this case that
the priority provisions of the Code relating to accessions are not. applicable
because the federal law relating to security interests in aircraft has preempted
the' field (cf. Section 9-104(a)).
Proceeds. Before we can handle priority problems relating to proceeds we
must be able to identify items which are
proceeds under the definition of Section
400.9-306(1). There can be borderline
situations where the question is not an
easy one. For example, in Universal
C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Prudential Investment Corp., 222 A. 2d 571 (Sup. Ct. R.I.
1966) the court, in a close case influenced no doubt by the peculiar facts involved, decided that insurance money
paid on an insurance policy covering
casualty to the collateral 'was not proceeds under the Code definition. In
Hoffman v. Snack, 2 UCC Rep. Serv.
862 (Com. P1. Pa. 1964), it was held
that debtor's claim for damages against
a third party for tortious destruction of
the collateral Was not proceeds.
Assuming we have proceeds involved,
it is important that the secured party
assure himself of a continuously perfected security interest flowing from the
original collateral into the proceeds. This
normally can be accomplished by filing
a financing statement which claims proceeds (Sections 400.9-402 and 400.9306(3) (a)). In re Platt, 257 F. Supp.
478 (D.C. Pa. 1966) indicates the difficulties which can be encountered when
one fails to claim proceeds in the financing statement.
If a perfected security interest is properly maintained in proceeds, the general
rule of thumb is that the secured party
should have the same priorities in the
proceeds as he would have had in the
original collateral. Girard Trust Corn Exchange Bank v. Warren Lepke Ford,
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Inc., 1 UCC Rep. Serv. 531 (Com. P1.
Pa. 1958) well illustrates the wonders
which can be worked prioritywise
through a perfected security interest in
proceeds. See also, Rodi Boat Co. v.
Provident tradesman's Bank &'Trust
Co., 339 F. 2d 259 (3rd Cir. 1964)
where the court, without reference to
the proceeds provisions of the Code,
reaches an appropriate result through
the application of common law proceeds
principles and the constructive trust device.
The special priority rule governing
chattel paper which is proceeds of the
sale of inventory subject to a perfected
security interest (Section 400.9-308)
was applied in Associates Discount Corp.
v. Old Freeport Bank, 421 Pa. 609, 220
A. 2d 621 (1966).
Default Procedures
While the Code permits self-help
repossession of collateral after default
(Section 400.9-503), a little care and
caution is indicated in the exercise of
this right. In Beggs v. Universal C.I.T.
Credit Corp., 409 S.W. 2d 719 (Sup.
Ct. Mo. .1966) the secured party was
stuck with $7,500 in punitive damages
because it had repossessed the wrong
truck.
Several cases have raised the question
of what constitutes effective notice of
resale after repossession. Baber v. William Ford Co., 239 Ark. 1054, 396 S.W.
2d 302 (1965); Mallicoat v. Volunteer
Finance & Loan Corp., 4 UCC Rep.

* **PERSONALIZED

Serv. 49 (Ct. App. Tenn. 1967). These
cases indicate to me the desirability of
including in the security agreement provisions which describe the techniques of
giving iaotice of resale so that this type
of litigation can be avoided.
First Nat. Bank of Glendale v. Sheriff,
34 Wis. 2d 535, 149 N.W. 2d 548
(1967) raised an interesting question
with which you could be faced. A judgment creditor caused the sheriff to levy
on goods which were subject to a perfected security interest. The secured
party sought to replevy the goods from
the sheriff despite the fact that the debtor was not in default under the terms
of the security agreement. The court refused to permit replevin- because without default under the security agreement, the secured party was -not entitled to possession of the goods. As the
court points out, Section 400.9-311 recognizes that there can be an involuntary
transfer of collateral by judicial process
and the goods would have to be sold
at the execution sale subject to the perfected security interest of the secured
party which should be ample protection
to him. Doesn't this case indicate the
usefulness of the common provision
found in security agreements that attachment, levy, etc., on the goods shall
constitute an act of default? Had there
been default in this case, secured party
would have been entitled to possession
and the replevin action should have
been successful. 0
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